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Enhanced Corporate Governance for Restaurant Companies:  
The Role of Well Performing Audit Committees 
      During the past decade, a multitude of problems regarding accounting and 
financial reporting issues in the United States have become exposed to broad 
based scrutiny by regulators and the media. Many large publicly traded companies 
such as Enron, World Com, Lehman Brothers and others have become bankrupt. 
In addition, General Motors in the manufacturing area and K-mart in the retailing 
sector have struggled as a result of poor management. Many financial services 
companies were forced to merge or be rescued by federal government 
intervention. Criminal sanctions were brought forth which caused the demise of 
Arthur Andersen, LLP, which had been one of the world’s largest public 
accounting firms.  (Andersen was later cleared of criminal actions about two to 
three years after it failed.) All of this caused the global business community to 
become fully aware of the significance of high quality, ethical financial reporting.  
 During 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley act was passed by the United States 
Congress and became law with President Bush’s signature. The goal was to usher 
in an era of improved financial reporting for the United States. A continuing need 
for effective, high quality financial reporting has been kept in the forefront by 
issues regarding subprime lending and various types of sophisticated and exotic 
financial instruments. In order to attain the goal of effective, high quality financial 
reporting, all of the significant participants in the financial reporting process have 
to fulfill many responsibilities. For publicly traded corporations, the list of 
significant participants typically includes the outside auditing firm, the internal 
auditors, senior management, and the corporation’s  board of directors. 
      An indispensible element of an effective financial accounting and reporting 
system is an effectively operating audit committee of the corporate board 
interfacing in a suitable fashion with the internal audit function.  One of the major 
responsibilities of the audit committee is to maintain oversight of the activities of 
management’s external and internal auditors. 
 
The Development of Audit Committees 
 Audit committees have been required since 1978 by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) when it mandated that all corporations traded on the NYSE 
have an audit committee composed of members from their boards of directors. At 
that point in time, the financial reporting community had recognized the 
importance of audit committees to the financial reporting process.  
 The National Commission of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, usually 
referred to as the Treadway Commission, emphasized the importance of audit 
committees and strongly recommended the adoption of audit committee reports in 
annual reports of corporations. The Treadway Commission’s recommendation 
was for the chairman of the audit committee to issue a report that would be 
  
 
included in the corporate annual financial report. A list of “good practice” 
guidelines for corporate audit committees was set forth by the Treadway 
Commission and are discussed in detail below. 
 
Good Practice Guidelines – General Guidelines 
The list of “good practice” guidelines was divided into three categories: 
general guidelines, selection of the independent outside auditor, and post-audit 
review. The size of the committee was among the items contained in the general 
guidelines. The good practice general guidelines suggested that a corporate audit 
committee should have at a minimum three members; yet, it should not be too 
large as to inhibit each member from being an active participant in the 
deliberations of the committee. The general guidelines also recommend that each 
corporate audit committee member should be an outside, independent director of 
the corporate board, and the terms of service on the audit committee should be 
staggered. Regular meetings of the audit committee and reporting to the corporate 
board of directors on a regular basis were also recommended by the Treadway 
Commission’s good practice general guidelines.  
 All recommendations in this paragraph are also part of the general 
guidelines of good practice. According to the National Commission of Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (1987), the corporate audit committee should oversee the 
audits of both the internal and external auditor. It is the corporate audit 
committee’s responsibility that there is coordination between both groups of 
auditors. The internal and external auditors should specify to the corporate audit 
committee how each of their audit scopes could lead to the detection of fraud or 
identify internal control weaknesses. The head of the internal audit function or 
other designated internal audit person and the independent public accountant 
should meet privately with the audit committee. Should there be cases where the 
independent accountant needs to rely on the work of other independent 
accountants, the audit committee must require that their independent accountant 
reviews the work of any other outside auditors. The audit committee must 
consider the use of any additional outside auditors as an appropriate procedure. 
The corporate audit committee must review, for compliance with company policy, 
the expenses of corporate officers and their use of company assets. Both the 
external and internal auditors need to be cognizant that the corporate audit 
committee needs to be informed of any specific topical areas they discover that 
requires the attention of the audit committee.  
 
Good Practice Guidelines – Selection of an Independent Accountant 
 The process for the selection of the independent public accountant by the 
corporate audit committee is the second category of guidelines contained in the 
Treadway Commission good practice guidelines. The audit committee needs to 
  
 
review the proposed audit fee and the engagement letter of the independent public 
accountant. The audit committee also should oversee the level of audit partner 
participation and the level of audit staff participation for the proposed audit 
engagement. Should the audit committee select a new independent accountant, it 
needs to review the process to enable a smooth transition from the predecessor to 
the successor independent accountant. Because the selection of the independent 
outside auditor must usually be ratified by the shareholders, the review process 
helps to facilitate the needed shareholder notification and ratification vote.  
 
Good Practice Guidelines – Post-Audit Review 
 The Treadway Commission also recommended another group of important 
duties for the audit committees. These duties pertain to the many steps that must 
be followed in a post audit review. The Treadway Commission specifies that the 
audit committee be responsible for meetings with the corporation’s legal counsel. 
Legal issues that could have a material impact on the corporation’s financial 
statements should be discussed.  These duties pertain to the many steps that must 
be followed in a post audit review. Management’s explanations must be sought by 
the audit committee for any significant variances in the financial statements 
regarding all years of comparative financial statements presented. The audit 
committee should review the consistency of the management’s discussion and 
analysis (M D & A) section of the annual report with the information disclosed in 
the annual report.  
 Another task for the audit committee is to question the outside auditors 
and corporate management regarding any changes in the application of accounting 
principles and auditing standards that would have an effect on the financial 
statements. Corporate management needs to be questioned by the audit committee 
regarding the existence of any items that may materially affect the financial 
statements. The audit committee should give special attention to any accounting 
accruals, significant reserves, estimates, and changes in estimates. The post-audit 
review process needs to have the audit committee meet privately with the outside 
auditors. This meeting should be a discussion of the quality of the internal audit 
function and the quality of the corporate accounting and finance staff. The outside 
auditors should discuss with the audit committee what the outside auditors’ 
greatest concerns are pertaining to the audit and if they would like to discuss any 
other issues that have not already been discussed.  
 The management representation letter should be reviewed by the audit 
committee. The outside auditor needs to be questioned by the audit committee 
whether any issues surfaced in obtaining the letter or receiving satisfactory 
coverage of issues set forth in the representation letter. The audit committee also 
needs to deal with another set of issues that could have come to light during the 
audit. These other issues concern contingencies, litigation, other claims, 
  
 
judgments or assessments that were viewed by outside lawyers or in-house 
company legal staff. The resolution of these legal issues or contingencies and/or 
their disclosure in the corporation’s financial statements must be determined by 
the audit committee.  
 The audit committee needs to review the M D & A section of the 
corporate annual report with corporate management and the outside auditor. The 
consistency of the other information contained in the corporation’s annual report 
with the financial statements must be determined by the audit committee.  Any 
issues related to this must be discussed with the outside auditor. The audit 
committee must determine whether the outside auditors need to meet with the 
corporation’s full board of directors regarding answering any questions pertaining 
to the audit of the outside auditors. 
 
Good Practice Guidelines - Audit Committee Chairman’s Letter 
 The Treadway Commission recommended that the chairman of the audit 
committee should have a letter in the corporate annual report that would 
summarize the duties and activities of the audit committee. Because the Treadway 
Commission’s recommendations did not have the force of a Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
reporting requirement, only a very small number of corporate annual reports have 
ever included an audit committee chairman’s letter. However, the functioning of 
the company’s audit committee has been described by a significant majority of 
listed companies in the company’s report of management (Kintzele, 1991).  These 
companies believed it necessary to discuss their audit committee function in their 
annual reports, but they did not want to create a separate report in the form of an 
audit committee chairman’s letter.  Those concerned about financial reporting on 
the functioning of the audit committee found the discussion in the report of 
management lacking much that was suggested to be written in the audit 
committee chairman’s letter. 
 Independent, outside directors are required by the different stock 
exchanges to serve as audit committee members.  Not being an employee of the 
corporation was the initial interpretation of an outside director.  Soon a class of 
“grey area” directors was identified.  Retired management, relatives of 
management, consultants hired by the corporation, and individuals serving as 
interlocking directors on two or more corporations were considered “grey area” 
directors.  The independent functioning of the audit committee could be at risk if 
“grey area” directors served on the committee.  A study (Klein, 2002) on the 
independence issue of audit committees concluded that audit committee 
independence increases with board size and board independence and decreases 
with the firm’s growth opportunities and for firms that report consecutive losses.  
In 1999 both the NYSE and the NASD (National Association of Securities 
  
 
Dealers) declared requirements that permitted corporations the option of including 
non-outside directors on their audit committees if they conclude that it is in the 
best interest of the corporation to do so. 
 A Blue Ribbon Committee was established by the NYSE and the NASD in 
1998.  The committee attempted to address concerns of the SEC regarding audit 
committee accounting and reporting practices.  The Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999) issued its 
report and ten major recommendations as follows: 
1. Strict definitions of independence of directors serving on audit 
committees of listed companies should be adopted by the NYSE and 
NASD. 
2. Larger companies should be required by the NYSE and NASD to 
have audit committees composed entirely of independent directors. 
3. Larger companies should be required by the NYSE and NASD to 
have “financially literate” directors on their audit committees. 
  
 
 
4. Each company should be required by the NSYE and NASD to adopt 
a formal audit committee charter and review its adequacy annually. 
5. Each company should be required by the SEC to disclose in its proxy 
statement whether it has adopted an audit committee charter, as well 
as other information. 
6. Audit committee charters must state that the outside auditor is 
ultimately accountable to the board of directors and the audit 
committee for each company listed on the NYSE and NASD. 
7. Companies listed on the NYSE and NASD should ensure that their 
charters mandate that their audit committees communicate with the 
outside auditor about independence issues, in accordance with 
Independence Standards Board regulations. 
8. Generally accepted auditing standards should require that the outside 
auditor discuss with the audit committee the quality—not just the 
acceptability—of accounting principles used. 
9. The corporate annual report should include a letter from the audit 
committee clarifying that it has reviewed the audited financial 
statements with management and performed other tasks required by 
the SEC. 
10. The outside auditor should be required by the SEC to perform an 
interim review under SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information, 
before a company files its Form 10-Q. 
11.  
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness 
 The Panel on Audit Effectiveness, usually referred to as the O’Malley 
Panel, was created in 1999 by the Public Oversight Board which was the 
independent, private-sector body that oversaw the programs of the SEC Practice 
Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  The 
SEC had concerns about the deliberate efforts by corporate management to 
manipulate earnings.  This panel was created as a response to those concerns.  The 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000) issued a report with the following 
recommendations which relate to audit committees:  
1. Increase emphasis on internal control.  Management should provide a 
written report on the effectiveness of internal control.   
2. Evaluate corporate reserves and review activity in them with the 
auditors and management. 
3. Have a minimum of two face-to-face meetings with the auditors.  At 
least one meeting should be in private.  Topics to be discussed 
include such issues as business risks, pressures on auditors, auditor 
  
 
performance, and any plans to hire audit firm personnel into high-
level positions. 
4. Request a report by management on the corporation’s control 
environment and how that environment along with established 
policies and procedures help to prevent or detect financial statement 
fraud. 
5. Ensure that there is cooperation between management and auditors, 
so that auditors’ efforts relating to the detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting are successful. 
6. The audit committee should determine the threshold amount to pre-
approve non-audit services. 
  
 
 
Actions by the SEC 
 Corporations were being persuaded by such bodies as the Treadway 
Commission, the Blue Ribbon Committee and the O’Malley Panel to adopt their 
recommendations.  These commissions and panels could only make 
recommendations, but the SEC sets regulations that corporations must follow.  On 
December 15, 2000 the SEC issued a regulation requiring corporations in their 
proxy statements to provide a report from their audit committee. The report was to 
disclose whether the audit committee had recommended that the corporation’s 
audited financial statements be filed with the SEC.  Another disclosure was to 
state whether the audit committee had a written charter which stated specific 
duties of the committee.  The SEC required that every three years the charter 
would need to be submitted to the SEC. 
 New listing standards for the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange and 
the NASDAQ were additionally approved by the SEC.  These standards require 
corporation’s disclosure whether their audit committee members are independent 
of management and require that audit committee members have some financial 
expertise. 
 The SEC was empowered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to establish the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  By April 2003 the 
board was functional.  The PCAOB sets standards for auditing publicly traded 
companies and on a test basis reviews these audits performed by certified public 
accountants for conformance with these standards.  The establishment of many 
regulations was left by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to the SEC. 
 Final rules were adopted by the SEC on March 3, 2003 that require a 
public company to disclose whether its audit committee includes at least one 
member who is considered a financial expert.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2003) defines an audit committee financial expert as possessing the 
following attributes: 
• an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and 
financial statements; 
• the ability to assess the general application of such principles in 
connection with accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves; 
• experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing, or evaluating financial 
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of 
accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and 
complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by 
the issuer’s financial statements, or experience actively supervising 
one or more persons engaged in such activities; 
• an understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial 
reporting; and 
  
 
• an understanding of audit committee functions. 
Comparison of S&P 100 and Large Restaurant Companies 
The previous section of this paper provides an extensive review of the role 
of audit committees in corporate governance in the United States.  It was intended 
to erect the background necessary to determine the extent to which companies in 
general, and restaurant companies in particular, are complying with audit 
committee mandates and recommendations. This background provides a basis for 
comparing certain aspects of the audit committees of S&P100 companies with 
those of the top 51 restaurant companies. 
A prior research project (Kintzele, Arndt, Kintzele & Kwiatowski, 2008) 
reported on the audit committee disclosures of the S&P 100 companies for 2006. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the membership of audit committees for both the 
S&P 100 companies and the top 51 restaurant companies in Value Line, Inc., for 
2008.  Recall that the Treadway Commission recommended at least three 
members for an audit committee. This table reveals that for the S&P 100 
companies, just over half (51%) had three or four members on the audit 
committee while most (86%) of the restaurant companies had three or four 
members on the committee. All but one of the 51 restaurant companies met 
Treadway’s recommendation for the minimum number of audit committee 
members. Forty nine percent of the S&P 100 companies had over five audit 
committee members, while only 12% of the restaurant companies had that many 
members. Companies in the restaurant industry tend to have smaller audit 
committees than is the case for S&P 100 companies. 
Table 1 
 
Membership on Audit Committees 
 
Number of members S&P 100 2006 Restaurant companies 2008/2009 
 % % 
Two 0 2 
Three or four 51 86 
Five or six 44 12 
Seven or eight 5 0 
Nine or more 0 0 
 
Table 2 provides information on the number of audit committee meetings 
held in a year. Whereas 75% of the S&P 100 firms held nine or more meetings 
  
 
per year, only 19% of the restaurant companies met that many times per year. 
Most (61%) of the restaurant companies met 6 or fewer times per year compared 
to only 13% of the S&P 100 firms. All of the restaurant companies met the 
recommendation of having at least three audit committee meetings per year. 
  
 
 
Table 2  
 
Number of Audit Committee Meetings in the Year 
 
Number of Meetings S&P 100 2006 Restaurant companies 2008/2009 
 % % 
One or two 0 0 
Three or four 2 37 
Five or six 11 24 
Seven or eight  11 20 
Nine or ten 33 12 
More than ten 42 7 
*Percentages do not equal 100% due to rounding. 
 
Other important audit committee disclosures are presented in Table 3.  
This table reveals that 85% of the S&P 100 companies reported that they had a 
stated policy, for example, on how to deal with the situation when someone in the 
company reports irregularities with the accounting function. This is often referred 
to as a “whistleblower” policy. However, in the case of the restaurant companies, 
98% reported having a stated whistleblower policy. For example, in the audit 
charter of the McDonald’s Corporation (2008), under “Whistle blowing 
Procedures” it states:  “The Committee shall establish and maintain procedures 
for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints received by the Company 
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing matters and for the 
confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the Company of concerns 
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.” 
When it came to the credentials of members of the audit committees, 86% 
of the S&P 100 companies surveyed indicated at least one member should be 
considered a “financial expert.” For the restaurant companies, 98% reported at 
least one member should be a “financial expert.”  Restaurant companies are doing 
considerably better than the S&P100 companies in regard to this 
recommendation. In the audit charter of Denny’s Corporation (2008), the policy is 
stated as follows: “At least one member of the Committee shall be an “audit 
committee financial expert” as defined by the SEC, and the company will make 
the disclosure required by the rules and regulations of the SEC with respect to 
such matters.” 
  
 
A big difference between the S&P 100 companies and the restaurant 
companies had to do with restrictions that committee members could not be on 
other public companies’ audit committees.  The charter of the Cheesecake Factory 
(2009) states:  “A member of the Committee may not serve on the audit 
committee of more than two public companies in addition to the Company 
without the prior determination by a majority of the independent directors of such 
board that such concurrent service would not impair the member’s ability to serve 
effectively as a member of the committee.”  In the case of the S&P 100 
companies, 60% of those surveyed had such a policy whereas only 33% of the 
restaurant companies had one.  Restaurant companies are considerably behind the 
S&P 100 companies in this regard. 
When discussing whether an audit committee member must be literate in 
financial matters, only 85% of the S&P 100 companies believed it was important 
enough to be stated in the charter whereas 100% of the restaurant companies 
formally stated such a policy. In the charter of Bob Evans (2009), for example, 
the following policy is stated:  “All members of the Audit Committee must be 
able to read and understand fundamental financial statements including the 
Company’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement.”  Clearly, 
the restaurant companies are taking the financial literacy recommendation 
seriously. 
  
 
 
Table 3 
 
Additional Audit Committee Disclosures in Proxy Statements  
 
 S&P 100 2006 Restaurant companies 2008/2009 
Whistleblowers 85 98 
Financial Experts 86 98 
Other Committee Memberships 60 33 
Membership Financial Literacy 85 100 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Over the last several years, many industries have been tainted by scandals 
and poor management.  Specific examples include General Motors in the 
manufacturing area, K-Mart in the retailing sector and Lehman Brothers in the 
financial services industry. Audit committees can be effective vehicles to assist in 
corporate governance. Restaurant companies appear to be adhering well to 
recommendations on the composition and operation audit committees and value 
their role in enhancing corporate governance.  A reasonable conclusion is that 
good corporate governance, due in part to the strengths of the audit committees, in 
the restaurant industry has contributed to the lack of serious scandals in this sector 
of the economy. A greater number of members on the audit committees of the 
restaurant companies could provide more breadth and experience for those 
committees.  A limitation of this study that some of the higher percentages for the 
restaurant companies compared to the S&P 100 companies could be explained by 
the two year time lag between the two studies. Further research in this area could 
be done to compare restaurant and lodging companies with regard to the audit 
committee’s role in corporate governance. In the future, one would expect to see a 
closer relationship between the internal auditors and the audit committee. This 
would result in more value added to the financial reporting process. 
  
 
 
References 
Bob Evans Farms Inc. (2009). Charter of the Audit Committee of the Board of 
Directors of Bob Evans Farms, Inc. in proxy statement for Annual Report. 
Burger King Corporation. (2009). Corporate Responsibility Report. Retrieved 
from http://www.bk.com/en/us/company-info/corporate-
responsibility/corporate-governance.html. 
Cheesecake Factory Incorporated. (2009). Audit Committee Charter in proxy 
statement for Annual Report. 
Denny’s Corporation. (2008). Audit Committee Charter in proxy statement for 
Annual Report. 
Kintzele, M.R. (1991). The Use of Audit Committee Reports in Financial 
Reporting. Internal Auditing, 6 (4), 16.  
Kintzele, P.L., Arndt, T.L., Kintzele, M.R., Kwiatowski, V.E. (2008). Audit 
Committees and Internal Auditors: Their Roles in Financial Reporting 
Today. Internal Auditing, 23 (3), 30-37. 
Klein, A., (2002). Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence. 
The Accounting Review, 77 (2), 435-542. 
McDonald’s Corporation. (2008). Audit Committee Charter in proxy statement for 
Annual Report. 
McDonald’s Corporation. (2008). Statement of Corporate Governance. Retrieved 
from http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/investors/ 
corporate_governance.html. 
National Commission of Fraudulent Financial Reporting. (1987). Report of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 179-192. 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness. (2000). The Panel of Audit Effectiveness: Report 
and Recommendations. 
Ruby Tuesday, Inc. (2009). Corporate Governance Guidelines. Retrieved from 
http://www.rubytuesday.com/investors/governance. 
Securities & Exchange Commission. (2003). Release No. 33-8177. 
The Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees. (1999). Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees. 10-16. 
Value Line, Inc. (2009). Retrieved from 
http://www.valueline.com/lookup/current.aspx. 
